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FOREIGN FIRM ACCESS TO JAPANESE
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS: TRENDS IN
JAPANESE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
Jiro Tamurat
Abstract: The Japanese substantive competition law is, in theory, very well
equipped to prevent anticompetitive behavior that restricts competition. In reality, the
JFTC has been weak in enforcing the law. The JFTC has been particularly weak in two
areas, boycotts and non-price vertical restraints, making market entry difficult for foreign
firms. In response to criticisms of weakness, the JFTC released the 1991 Guideline that
states that boycotts may constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade and be subject to
administrative surcharges and possible criminal sanctions. Despite the strengthening of
the law against boycotts, no cases have been brought. Furthermore, the JFTC has yet to
make public the critical factors necessary to determine, a finding of non-price vertical
restraints. The author asserts that the-JFTC will have to bring increasing enforcement in
these two areas to create greater ease of foreign market entry.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental tenet of a "competitive market" is the freedom of new
firms and noncompetitive firms to enter and to exit a market. In accordance
t Faculty of Law, Keio University. The author would like to thank Jun Sato and Thomas Owsley
Rhodes of Keio University for their assistance in completing this Article.
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with this first tenet of competition, the Japan Antimonopoly Law ("AML")I
has the substantive legal power to protect competition. Yet, Japan's histori-
cal lack of emphasis on competition has allowed firms in the Japanese
market to benefit from government regulation and high market concentra-
tions that impede the entry of new firms.2 As the Japanese Government
increasingly liberalizes these regulations, the anticompetitive aspects of the
Japanese market structure deserve increased scrutiny.
Free market entry has implications for Japanese trade policy. In
1990, the Bush and the Kaifu Administrations concluded the Structural
Impediments Initiative ("SII"),3 a U.S.-Japan bilateral commitment to
reduce Japanese structural trade barriers. In an effort to secure greater
market entry for foreign firms in the Japanese market, the United States
pressured the Japanese Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC") to strengthen the
AML. As a result of the SII and internal pressure to adjust to a consumer
oriented society, the JFTC, among other measures, released a guideline in
1991 entitled the Antimonopoly Act Guidelines Concerning Distribution
Systems and Business Practices (Guidelines). 4  This administrative
guideline clarifies that group boycotts may constitute an unreasonable
restraint of trade, and thus are subject to surcharges and possible criminal
sanctions.
This article focuses attention on the methods and efforts to improve
freedom of entry into the Japanese market by increasing new entrant access,
both foreign and domestic, to the distribution system. The highly oli-
gopolistic nature of the Japanese distribution system warrants careful
consideration from a competition policy perspective; the structure has pre-
vented foreign firms from reaching the Japanese consumer through boycotts
and non-price vertical restraint market foreclosure.
I Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi k6sei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru h6ritsu (Law Concerning the
Prohibition of Private Monopoly and the Maintenance of Fair Trade), Law No. 54 of 1947 [hereinafter
Antimonopoly Law].
2 See generally ED LINCOLN, JAPAN'S UNEQUAL TRADE (1991).
3 SII was a Bush Administration initiative to define, in concert with Japan, structural barriers that
restrain trade. The United States pointed to keiretsu and the high cost of land as examples of structural
barriers to import access. Japan pointed out the U.S. Federal deficit as being a structural problem. See,
e.g., Andrew Pollack, A Tentative Japan is Giving Trust-Busting a Try, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1992, at DI;
Teresa Watanabe, Aftermath of the Bush Trip, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1992, at D1.
4 Ry-itsdi torihiki kank6 ni kansuru dokusen kinshi h6 j5 no shishin [Antimonopoly Act Guidelines
Concerning Distribution Systems and Business Practices] (July 11, 1991).
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II. THE PROBLEM: BOYCOTS AND NoN-PRIcE VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
The organization of Japanese firms into cohesive groups, called
keiretsu, is criticized as anticompetitive by foreign finms attempting to enter
the Japanese market. The keiretsu structure may facilitate two different
practices that limit competition from foreign firms: boycotts and non-price
vertical restraints.
In simple terms, a boycott is any concerted agreement among firms
not to deal with a specified firm. Due to the highly integrated nature of
keiretsu distribution systems with member firms, a decision not to deal with
competing foreign firms' products can prevent the foreign firm from enter-
ing the market.
Standards to determine the illegality of market entry problems
concerning non-price vertical restraints is not as clear-cut as boycotts.
Keiretsu distribution systems are characterized by many non-price vertical
restraints such as long term relationships, tie-ins, territorial restrictions and
exclusive contractual agreements. A non-price vertical restraint is any type
of restriction unrelated to price which is placed on one firm by another.
These restrictions between firms can directly affect market access for a
potential entrant.
The evaluation of which non-price vertical restraints are actionable
under the AML is entirely dependent upon factors such as market structure,
inter-brand competition, and market power. A keiretsu group's use of non-
price vertical restraints is in principle not an infraction of the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law. For example, a Japanese distributor's choice not to
deal with a product, foreign or domestic, may be a valid business decision
based upon freedom of contract. However, if several keiretsu structures
create an oligopolistic market structure, a keiretsu distribution system's
refusal to deal may have anticompetitive effects that can illegally prevent
foreign firm market entrance. To properly understand the JFTC's method of
analyzing boycotts and non-price vertical restraints, a brief explanation of
the structure of the Japanese AML is necessary.
A. Japan's Antimonopoly Law
The body of the AML that regulates anticompetitive conduct is
applied to three main categories: 1) private monopolization; 2) unreason-
able restraint of trade; and 3) unfair trade practices. The first two pillars,
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private monopolization and unreasonable restraint of trade, deal solely with
conduct that "substantially restrains trade, contrary to the public interest in
any field of trade," 5 while the third pillar deals with unfair trade practices
which "tend to impede fair competition."6 The differing thresholds between
"substantial restraint" and "tends to impede" are a major factor in the
manner by which the AML is enforced.
1. The First Two Pillars
Article 2(5) concerns "Private Monopolization." Under article 2(5)
of the AML "private monopolization" is defined as "any entrepreneur,
individually, or by combination or conspiracy with other entrepreneurs, or
in any other manner, [who] excludes or controls the business activities of
other entrepreneurs, thereby restraining... substantially competition in any
particular field of trade." 7 The term "substantial" in this provision refers to
the ability of any single, or group of, entrepreneur(s) to control a market by
influencing price, quality, volume of product flow, or other various business
conditions.
Similarly, under the second pillar, article 2(6) defines, among other
things, cartels. Under article 2(6), "unreasonable restraint of trade" occurs
when "any entrepreneur, by contract or agreement or any other concerted
actions .... substantially [restrains] competition in any particular field of
trade."s It is important to note that both article 2(5) concerning
monopolization and article 2(6) concerning cartels must meet the threshold
of "substantial restraint" to be defined and violate article 3 of the AML.9
2. The Third Pillar
Unlike the "substantial restraint of trade" threshold for article 3
infractions, the threshold for finding "unfair trade practices" is compara-
tively lower, requiring only a "tendency to impede competition." "Tends to
impede" is defined as the possibility that conduct may impede fair competi-
tion. Therefore, to find an infraction of the unfair trade practices provision
of the AML, no proof of "substantial restraint" is necessary. If the conduct
5 Antimonopoly Law, supra note 1, arts. 2(5), 2(6).
6 Id. art. 2(9) (def'ming unfair trade practices).
7 Id. art. 2(5).
8 Id. art. 2(6).
9 Id. art. 3 (prohibiting private monopolization and substantial restraint of trade).
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in question has the "'tendency" to impede, it can be challenged as unfair.
Academic interpretations of the "tendency" threshold used in the unfair
trade practices pillar explain that it is a precautionary measure to prevent
business activity which aids in the concentration of economic power, which
can be the first step to creating a private monopoly. Under the "tendency"
standard, the primacy of protection of market entry is underscored by the
JFTC Antimonopoly Law Research Group ReportlO findings. In 1982, these
findings announced that conduct which "tends to impede fair competition"
includes actions resulting in restriction of fair competition, as evidenced by
the following: 1) a tendency to obstruct free competition; 2) methods of
competition that are unfair; and 3) market fundamentals are not main-
tained.1' With the JFTC "tendency" doctrine in mind, this article will now
examine the Distribution Guidelines of 1991, the changes made concerning
the enforcement of boycotts, and how in theory this should help foreign
firm entry into the Japanese market. After examining boycotts, this article
will then examine the case law concerning boycotts and non-price vertical
restraints that have implications for market entry.
B. Guidelines and a New Treatment of Boycotts
Pillar three of the unfair trade practices section has two main compo-
nents. First, all unfair trade practices are defined under article 2(9)12 and
classified under Notification 15 of 1982.13 Second, conduct that is defined
as illegal is prohibited by both article 1914 and, if there is "substantial
10 See JFTC ANTIMONOPOLY LAW RESEARCH GROUP, THE FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECrIVE WITH
RESPECT TO UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES (July 8, 1982).
11 Id.
12 Under art. 2(9) of the Antimonopoly Law, the term "unfair trade practices" includes all of the fol-
lowing:
(i) Unjustly discriminating against other entrepreneurs;
(ii) Dealing at unjust prices;
(iii) Unjustly inducing or coercing customers of a competitor to deal with oneself;
(iv) Dealing with another party on such terms as will restrict unjustly the business activities of
the said party;
(v) Abuse of dominant position in the transaction; and
(vi) Unreasonable interference in the internal matters of competitors.
Antimonopoly Law, supra note 1, art. 2(9).
13 Notification 15 designates sixteen unfair business practices pursuant to the six basic categories in
2(9). In general, they are concerned with: (1) Concerted Refusal to Deal, (10) Tie-in sales, (11) Dealing
on Exclusive Terms (13) Dealing on Restrictive Terms and (14) Abuse of Dominant Bargaining Position.
14 Article 19 states that "No entrepreneur shall employ unfair trade practices."
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restraint," article 315 respectively. As previously stated, a concerted
agreement between manufacturers and retailers/distributors to refuse to deal
with a competing product is a boycott. Prior to the 1991 Guidelines, such a
boycott was enforced under article 19, and thus subject to only cease and
desist orders. It was not enforced as an "unreasonable restraint of trade,"
and therefore not subject to the surcharges and possible criminal charges,
under the more strict standard of article 3.
Following the SII negotiations, the JFTC Guidelines changed the
administrative treatment of boycotts. The change made it possible to bring
criminal action and surcharges against a boycott under the "unreasonable
restraint of trade" provision of article 3 if it was determined that the boycott
was significant. An example of such conduct would include a situation in
which manufacturers and retailer/distributors agree not to handle imported
goods of a significant entrepreneur that compete with those of the manufac-
turer. Since the issuance of the Guidelines, there have been no article 3
cases brought against Japanese firms boycotting foreign fhms. (The follow-
ing case is an example of a boycott by a Japanese firm which was found to
be an "unreasonable restraint of trade.")
1. Ishizuka Case16
The Ishizuka case concerns a violation of article 8(1)(5) as an unfair
trade practice. This provision prohibits trade associations from "causing
entrepreneurs to employ such acts as to constitute unfair trade practice." 17
In summary, Ishizuka Glass Company, in concert with other secondary
manufacturers of replacement automobile glass, entered into an agreement
with the Tokyo Metropolitan Automobile Parts Association (Tokyo-to
Jid6sha Bukai) and parts wholesalers to boycott any manufacturer or
wholesaler that sold products at a discount price.
To execute the price stabilization and restraint of competition, the
Association entered into a tri-lateral agreement with the secondary manufac-
turers and wholesaling agents. According to the agreement, secondary
manufacturers and wholesalers decided upon the price at which to sell their
15 Article 3 states that "No entrepreneur shall effect private monopolization or any unreasonable
restraint of trade." Antimonopoly Law, supra note 1, art. 3
16 Judgment of Dec. I I, 1967 (Ishizuka), FTC [decision], 14 Shinketsushii 14.
17 Antimonopoly Law, supra note 1, ch. 3, (concerning Trade Associations). It is important to note
that trade association violations correspond to article 19 violations under the "Unfair Trade Practices" pillar
of the AML.
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secondary manufactured goods. Additionally, the tri-lateral group decided
not to deal with secondary manufacturers and wholesalers that traded
secondary manufactured goods through non-Association members. The use
of the threat of a boycott to maintain the price fixing agreement was found
to be an unreasonable dealing restriction, and in violation of article 3.
Furthermore, the act of restricting wholesalers to deal only with Association
members falls under article 8(1)(5), which prohibits trade associations from
engaging ".. . in any acts which... [cause] entrepreneurs to employ such
acts as constitute unfair trade practices."' 8
C. Non-price Vertical Restraint Case Law
Non-price vertical restraints is another area of law related to market
entry issues. Contrary to the lack of article 3 boycott case law, there is
significant case law concerning non-price vertical restraint as unfair trade
practices under Notification 11, which restricts undue exclusive dealing,
and under Notification 13, which restricts undue restrictive dealing. In
examining the relevant case law, it becomes apparent that the JFTC has only
brought action against non-price vertical restraints executed by firms that
occupy extraordinarily high market shares, making determination of anti-
competitve effect relatively easy. In the interest of increasing market entry,
the next step for the JFTC is to increasingly scrutinize the non-price vertical
restraints of firms that hold lower market shares.
1. Fuji X-ray19
The Fuji X-ray case concerns the infraction of competition law in the
form of non-price vertical restriction initiated by Fuji Films' 100% owned
subsidiary, Fuji X-ray. Fuji X-ray, occupying 53% of the medical X-ray
film market, was accused of restrictive dealing and binding restrictions
including territorial restriction of sales. Fuji X-ray controlled the resale
prices of its distributor, and prevented the distributor from competing in
other distributors' territory. Fuji X-ray, by forming a territorial restriction,
essentially lessened competition among the distributors. Through its
closed-territory action, Fuji Film successfully controlled intra-brand com-
18 Id. ch. 3, art. 8(l)(5).
19 Judgment of May 11, 1981 (Fuji X-ray), FTC [decision], 28 Shinketsushi 39.
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petition in the concerned market, and also limited inter-brand competition. 20
Fuji X-ray's high market concentration makes any effort to restrict, whether
inter- or intra-brand competition, a tendency to impede competition. The
JFTC ruled that the Fuji X-ray activity constituted a violation as an Unfair
Trade Practice under article 19, specified under Notification 13,21 and
required Fuji X-ray to cease and desist the practices.
2. Zenhanren22
In the Zenhanren case, Zenhanren (Japanese Agricultural
Cooperative) forced almost all firms to use new linen bags to pack and store
rice while concurrently controlling the linen bag distribution system.
Furthermore, Zenhanren forced linen bag manufacturers to supply linen
bags to the members of its Cooperative before supplying to other competi-
tors. Zenhanren thus prevented the linen bag manufacturers from dealing
with other companies before completing the delivery of the contracted
amount of bags to Cooperative firms. The Cooperative did not allow the
bag manufacturers to deal directly with the members, but forced all products
to move through Zenhanren. Zenhanren was found to be "dealing with
exclusive conditions" under Notification 11. Looking at Zenhanren's
actions from the perspective of "exclusion of competitors.., it [Zenhanren]
excluded competitors that deal in the distribution of new linen bags, main-
taining its own monopolistic position." The result was a cease and desist
order issued by the JFTC.
20 HASEGAWA, J(HJ HANREI KAISETSU (1981).
21 The original ruling of the Fuji X-ray case was prior to the 1982 Fair Trade Commission
Notification No. 15, and was originally found in violation of article 8.
22 Judgment of Dec. 4, 1963 (Zenhanren), FTC [decision], 12 Shinketsush'i 39. In both the
Zenhanren (Japan Agricultural Sales Cooperative) and the Zenkoku Nogyo Rengo (Japan Farming Produce
Association) case, the defendants were cooperatives exempted from the AML pillar two application by ar-
ticle 24. However, in the provision of article 24, it is clearly stated that even cooperatives are not
exempted from scrutiny under unfair dealing methods. The exemption applies as long as the following re-
quirements regarding the cooperative are met: 1) its purpose shall be the mutual aid among small scale
entrepreneurs or consumers; 2) it shall be voluntarily formed; 3) each member shall posses equal voting
rights; and 4) if distribution of profits among members is contemplated, the limits shall be stipulated in law
or an order, or in the article of association.
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3. Zenkoku Nogyo Rengokai23
The next case involves Zenkoku Nogyo Rengokai (The Japanese
Agricultural Produce Cooperative - Zenno). In this case, a manufacturer of
corrugated cardboard bought paper from Zenno and then sold the finished
product directly to customers. Zenno, with a sixty percent share of all sales
of corrugated cardboard, stopped supplying the manufacturer to prevent
low-priced sales by a non-Zenno route. Furthermore, Zenno requested that
its member entrepreneurs refuse to purchase products from the parent
company of this newly established cardboard manufacturing firm. Given
the effect of excluding competitors, Zenno's action is clearly illegal for two
reasons: 1) its purpose is to exclude new entry by potentially competitive
companies and 2) its improper use of the power over the other firms in
making them not deal with the new market entrant. These two factors taken
together have the same effect of excluding competitors as concerted refusals.
to deal.2 4 In summary, the JFTC administered a cease and desist order
against Zenno because Zenno had forced a new entrant in the corrugated
cardboard box market to exit the market as a result of its "undue restrictive
dealing."
The above non-price vertical restraint cases are examples of enforce-
ment by the JFTC of the AML against conduct that forecloses a market and
prevents new market entry. In each case, the JFTC considered the act of
excluding a competitor from the market as a serious factor in deciding
whether the non-price vertical restraint constituted a violation. Yet this
consideration was overshadowed in each case by the defendants extraordi-
nary dominant market position. Furthermore, most of the cases brought by
the JFTC concern firms that are expelled from a market through boycott and
restrictive dealing. Although "market foreclosure" and "entry barrier"
theory are related, they do not directly address the market entry needs of
foreign firms not yet in the Japanese market.
IlL. CONCLUSION
Foreign firms currently face barriers to market entry in Japan. One
impediment to increasing market entry is the ambiguity of the JFTC non-
price vertical restraint analysis. Unlike the relatively clear articulation of
23 Judgment of Feb. 20, 1990 (Zenkoku Nagy5 Rengokai), FTC [decision], 36 ShinketsushFi 53.
24 SANEKATA, 4 HANREi HYAKUSEN.
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the "rule of reason" in the U.S., the JFTC has yet to articulate the leading
factors that are used in determining what type of restraint in what kind of
market condition is "pro" or "anti" competitive. Obviously, enforcement of
non-price vertical restraint law is a process of balancing "pro" and "anti"
competitive effects, but the JFTC has yet to clarify what it perceives as the
leading factors and their relative weights. The JFTC should clarify these
factors. Furthermore, priority should be given to market foreclosure that
may tend to impede new entry. The result would place a heavy burden of
proof on the pro-competitive aspects for any vertical restraint that might
restrain free competition.
The JFTC should be more receptive to the benefits of potential com-
petition provided by foreign firms. Along these lines, the JFTC should
actively enforce against conduct that impedes foreign access to the Japanese
market and that is considered a "tendency to impede competition."
Similarly, the JFTC has issued the 1991 Guidelines which announced that
the JFTC will aggressively pursue conduct that boycotts foreign firms under
article 3. The JFTC, however, has yet to act in accordance with this admin-
istrative change.
One of the most important points of the antimonopoly regulation of
Japan's distribution system is to prevent barriers to market entry. In the
present state of enforcement, the JFTC falls short of achieving this goal.
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